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Charting Regulatory Stewardship in  
Health Research
Making the Invisible Visible
GRAEME T. LAURIE, EDWARD S. DOVE, AGOMONI GANGULI-MITRA,  
ISABEL FLETCHER, CATRIONA MCMILLAN, NAYHA SETHI, and ANNIE SORBIE
Abstract: This article analyses a hitherto largely obscured feature of regulatory environ-
ments in health research; namely, the role of regulatory stewardship. Through examples 
drawn from research ethics committees, emerging technologies, and governance of research 
resources, it outlines the essential features of regulatory stewardship, and argues that this 
concept can demonstrate considerable added value for all parties in delivering and benefit-
ing from efficient and effective navigation of regulatory landscapes. It offers an exposition of 
the normative principles and associated responsibilities of the concept. The extant invisibility 
of regulatory stewardship requires fuller recognition and better integration of the approach 
into the effective functioning of law and regulation in the health research context.
Keywords: regulation; governance; research ethics; stewardship; custodianship; data; 
collective responsibility; proportionality
Introduction
In June 2016, the High Level Expert Group (HLEG) of the European Open 
Science Cloud (EOSC) suggested that up to 500,000 “data experts” trained in 
the principles of open science and research data commons will be needed to 
support the more than 70,000,000 researchers and other workers dealing with 
data and innovation around the globe.1 This reflected the call of the Council of 
the European Union in May 2016 to the European Union Commission “to pro-
mote data stewardship—including training activities and awareness raising—
and to implement Data Management Plans as an integral part of the research 
process.”2 The EOSC HLEG’s June 2016 report offered a road map to deliver on 
this vision, but it did not provide detail on what such a data stewardship role 
This section focuses on the ethical, legal, social, and policy questions 
arising from research involving human and animal subjects.
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entails, nor on how it links with regulation in areas such as data protection and 
information technology.3 If the EOSC group’s recommendation of 500,000 data 
experts serving a stewardship role is an accurate measure of an unmet need, then 
the urgency to craft the principles and standards behind stewardship, both within 
and outside the data context, is considerable. More recently still, a joint report by 
the British Academy and the Royal Society on data management and use has 
called for the creation of a new stewardship body to support delivery of the full 
breadth of critical functions necessary for effective data governance. It argues that 
such a stewardship body should be: “(i) independent, (ii) deeply connected to 
diverse communities, (iii) expert across and beyond disciplines, (iv) tightly cou-
pled to decision processes, (v) durable and visible, and (vi) nationally focused 
but globally relevant.”4 We suggest that, taken together, these initiatives repre-
sent a call for a new model of regulatory stewardship. However, if the comple-
mentarity of regulatory stewardship to existing regulatory mechanisms is not 
explored, defined, and defended further, we risk adding to regulatory burden 
rather than alleviating it.
This article builds on the recommendations from the British Academy/Royal 
Society and on the EOSC HLEG’s acknowledgement of the potential importance 
of stewardship in the research data context; it does so by charting what we believe 
are the key features of regulatory stewardship, including its core principles, in the 
context of health research. Although stewardship is a concept that has received 
a decent amount of treatment in policy and healthcare ethics literature in recent 
years, regulatory stewardship is an invisible but centrally vital concept deserving 
of greater recognition and instantiation in regulatory practice. We argue herein 
that regulatory stewardship can demonstrate considerable added value for all 
parties in delivering and benefiting from efficient and effective navigation of regu-
latory landscapes, as long as clarity is provided about the nature of its features and 
functions. Moreover, the potential for such a role extends across the entirety of 
the health research context, from data-related research to clinical trials involving 
investigational medicinal products.
Therefore, although we welcome initiatives such as the EOSC to bolster research 
and innovation, we argue that their success, especially in the health research 
context, rests on first adequately addressing three features with respect to regula-
tory stewardship:
 
 1)  the need to identify and to communicate clearly the meaning of, principles 
behind, and responsibilities that arise from “stewardship”;
 2)  the importance of recognizing, defending, and implementing “regulatory 
stewardship” as the collective responsibility of all stakeholders involved 
across all areas of health-related research (i.e., stewardship is not under 
the remit of regulators or researchers alone); and
 3)  the central role of clearly embedding appropriate regulatory stewardship 
responsibilities in law and regulation, including into any training and aware-
ness raising for stakeholders in health research.
 
The analysis proceeds as follows: first, we provide an account of the range of ways 
in which stewardship is defined; second, we consider the range of ways in which 
stewardship is invoked in a variety of contexts; third, we offer an analysis of the 
nature of the roles that seem to be undertaken, and the values and principles that 
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they seem to embody; and fourth, we argue for a model of regulatory stewardship 
that incorporates obligations to support and promote responsible health research 
in ways that are complementary to other regulatory functions. Our model is com-
posed of key features that we outline at the end of the article.
We acknowledge that the recognition of a role for stewardship in health research 
assumes a position that is determinedly pro-research. We do not seek to question 
this assumption in this article; rather, we aim to chart the features of this increasingly 
common function across various contexts, and thereby contribute to completing 
the full picture of health research regulation. Our claim to originality is in the devel-
opment of the concept of regulatory stewardship.
What is Stewardship?
There is disagreement in the literature on what constitutes a steward or stewardship, 
in part because they can operate at different levels (from the local to the global), 
although common features are present. In this section, we highlight several under-
standings of stewardships in the healthcare policy and ethics context, with a view 
to pulling out common threads to develop the contours of regulatory stewardship.
The HLEG of the EOSC defines data stewardship as “the entire process that 
deals responsibly with one’s own and other people’s data throughout and after 
the scientific discovery process,”5 suggesting that stewardship entails diligent 
management of something or someone across multiple stages of an endeavor, 
although this does not ipso facto comprise an ethical or legal duty. The HLEG does 
not spell out which actors may be charged with a stewardship role, nor, as we have 
said, how this role aligns with regulations that impact on data processing and 
sharing.
The idea of stewardship is also relatively common in the field of public health. 
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics has used it to capture notions of state responsi-
bility for providing conditions that allow people to be healthy, especially in relation 
to reducing health inequalities.6 Examples include measures “[to] promote health 
not only by providing information and advice, but also by programmes to help 
people overcome addictions and other unhealthy behaviours.”7 The framing of the 
role as “stewardship” is important for a number of features, not the least of which 
is the sense that part of the responsibility concerns an ushering and guiding role 
in the promotion of health, well-being and equality, while not being overly pater-
nalistic and respecting the integrity of the surrounding infrastructure.
Somewhat similarly, the World Health Organization (WHO) defines stewardship 
in political rather than moral or legal terms. For them, stewardship constitutes:
the wide range of functions carried out by governments as they seek to 
achieve national health policy objectives.…Stewardship is a political pro-
cess that involves balancing competing influences and demands. It will 
include: maintaining the strategic direction of policy development and 
implementation; detecting and correcting undesirable trends and distor-
tions; articulating the case for health in national development; regulating 
the behaviour of a wide range of actors—from health care financiers to 
health care providers; and establishing effective accountability mechanisms. 
Beyond the formal health system stewardship means ensuring that other 
areas of government policy and legislation promote—or at least do not 
undermine—peoples’ health. In countries that receive significant amounts 
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of development assistance, stewardship will be concerned with managing 
these resources in ways that promote national leadership, contribute to 
the achievement of agreed policy goals, and strengthen national manage-
ment systems. While the scope for exercising stewardship functions is 
greatest at the national level, the concept can also cover the steering role 
of regional and local authorities.8
The WHO’s definition, which is perhaps the paradigmatic global understanding 
of stewardship, suggests that stewardship is about political (state) actors providing 
services to a population, setting and enforcing the rules of the game, and providing 
strategic direction for all the different actors involved. It is systems-level oversight 
with a view toward long-term sustainability of resources.
Closer to the clinical (and local) context, moral overtones come into play more 
overtly. For example, Lynn Jansen would seem to disagree with the WHO’s notion 
of stewardship, arguing that the contents in the definition are better seen as matters 
of distributive justice rather than as matters of stewardship in healthcare.9 As she 
writes: “In general, stewards are persons who are charged with the task of taking 
good care of that with which they have been entrusted.”10 Jansen defines steward-
ship in medicine as: “a duty that applies in a space between the obligations of health 
care providers to provide beneficent care to their patients on the one hand and the 
obligations of citizens to bring about and support a just health care system on the 
other. Seen with clear eyes, stewardship in medicine is neither a consequence of 
beneficent medical care nor a substitute for justice.”11
We will later return to Jansen’s comment that stewardship is a duty that falls into 
a space between the ethical duties of beneficence and justice. For now, we observe 
that for Jansen, stewardship has an important and distinctive place in clinical 
medical ethics. Namely, it is a duty for healthcare professionals to use healthcare 
resources and provision of healthcare responsibly when they and patients alike are 
confronted with what she calls “zones of discretion”; that is, a gray area in medical 
decisionmaking resulting from lack of evidence (e.g., when more than one treatment 
option is available and, according to the best evidence available, no one option is 
superior to the others).
Considerations of good stewardship direct health care providers to select 
the most cost-effective response among the eligible options in a zone of 
discretion. When they do so, they act responsibly because they act in a 
way that responds to the fact that health care resources are finite and that 
excessive costs for some leave less for others. They also act beneficently 
toward their patients, because they do not act in a way that is contrary to 
the best medical interests of their patients.12
In these zones of discretion, healthcare professionals are “free to rely on their 
hunches and personal styles to select an option.”13 Stewardship could also apply 
to scenarios in which healthcare professionals must decide whether to ration 
resources at the bedside, although Jansen acknowledges that this is a controversial 
position.
Writing in this journal in the context of elderly persons, David Thomasma 
endorses Joseph Fletcher’s somewhat legalistic notion that a steward is “somebody 
who acts on behalf of a principal. He or she is an agent who carries out the prin-
cipal’s wishes.”14 Thomasma goes on to argue that stewardship entails one person 
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helping another person achieve certain aims, and requires educating these stewards 
(or stewards-in-training) about the value dimensions of those that they may steward, 
and how some of these values can supervene otherwise standard practices.
Beyond the healthcare context, in 2010, the Presidential Commission for the 
Study of Bioethical Issues released a report on synthetic biology that addressed 
regulation of emerging technologies. In their report, the Commission dedicated a 
section to exploring a core ethical principle of “responsible stewardship.” As they 
define it:
The principle of responsible stewardship reflects a shared obligation 
among members of the domestic and global communities to act in ways 
that demonstrate concern for those who are not in a position to represent 
themselves (e.g., children and future generations) and for the environ-
ment in which future generations will flourish or suffer. Responsible 
stewardship recognizes the importance of citizens and their representa-
tives thinking and acting collectively for the betterment of all.15
The report is an acknowledgement that responsible stewardship is an ethical prin-
ciple of growing significance and recognition; like the HLEG on the EOSC, the 
Presidential Commission invokes the notion of responsibility in stewardship. 
Similar to Thomasma and Fletcher, the Presidential Commission suggests that 
stewardship involves a kind of responsible and future-attuned care for others and 
each other so as to improve our collective well-being. However, in the regulatory 
context, the Presidential Commission goes on to suggest that responsible stewardship 
entails “an ongoing process of prudent vigilance that carefully monitors, identifies, 
and mitigates potential and realized harms over time” and “requires clarity, coordi-
nation, and accountability across the government.”16
The Presidential Commission’s discussion of responsible stewardship also reflects 
a number of the points that we will argue subsequently; namely, the links with 
collective responsibility, the need for cross-sectoral action, and the avoidance of 
risk fetishisation (as opposed to legitimate risk mitigation). Where we depart, 
however, is in two areas. First is the association of stewardship as a component of 
citizen participation. A key component of our added value is placing stewardship 
firmly within the regulatory context. Wider deliberative democratic input has its 
merits, but in the regulatory context, it is specifically (and, we claim, only) the 
actors situated in the regulatory spaces who need to embrace the responsibility of 
regulatory stewardship. Second, although it is acceptable to frame stewardship in 
an operational way (i.e., “What can and should we, as a society, do in response to 
emerging technologies or a particular ‘bad’ to be responsible stewards of nature, 
human health and well-being, and the world’s safety, now and into the future?”), 
this has the potential to be set up as demanding top-down intergovernmental 
agency solutions. On the contrary, we ask what stewardship might mean in the 
health research regulatory context specifically. Further, the solutions we propose 
when framing stewardship in an operational way suggest a role for top-down 
government; however, it must be complemented by a much more bottom-up, 
instantiated regulatory commitment.
These examples of stewardship operate at a range of different geographical and 
institutional levels ranging from the supranational (WHO) to the regional (Scotland). 
Furthermore, the definitions embody different normative aspects and therefore 
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emphasize different values, some of which may conflict. First, the Presidential 
Commission speaks of responsibility in stewardship. Similarly, the EOSC dis-
cusses process rather than actors, which leaves open the question of who will take 
on the various responsibilities. However, this emphasis on responsibility in pro-
cess might also point to the need for prudence when dealing with data. Second, 
in contrast with these examples, the WHO approach to stewardship recognizes 
a regulatory actor who already has a mandate of stewardship, and is understood 
as dealing with competing interests. This seems to be a call for ownership of that 
existing role, to perform it competently. This version of stewardship may also 
include broader strategic elements, such as assessing public interest claims made 
on behalf of particular pieces of research and entire research programs. Third, 
Jansen seems to point to a much deeper kind of stewardship that involves stewards 
balancing the two important, and sometimes conflicting, values of beneficence 
and justice. Finally, Thomasma, mentioned previously, describes a steward as a 
facilitator, for whom the aim and value of the role are far more clearly defined as 
“one person helping another” to achieve a desired aim. Developing accurate 
accounts of these normative roles will involve careful teasing out of the varying 
capacities and responsibilities of the different actors involved in health research 
regulation.
These diverse roles necessarily embody certain values and responsibilities. 
These include, but are not restricted to, health promotion, trust, care, guidance, 
and support. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that these (1) vary con-
siderably depending on context, (2) are potentially and problematically conflict-
ing, and (3) are question begging in terms of the values and responsibilities in 
play, upon whom the role of stewardship might fall, and with which correspond-
ing tasks.
Overarchingly, however, these examples from the literature do suggest that 
stewardship is about guiding others with prudence and care across one or more 
endeavors—without which there is risk of impairment or harm—and with a view 
to collective betterment. In the sections that follow, we examine what stewardship 
can mean in regulatory practice across a range of areas in health research, and 
whether it can constitute an ethical duty for actors engaged in regulatory practice. 
However, as we also argue, to date, regulatory stewardship is an “invisible” yet 
crucial component of regulatory frameworks.
The Invisibility of Regulatory Stewardship
In an increasingly complex regulatory landscape—reflected in the growth of 
statutes, case law, and guidelines directed at various stakeholders in research 
endeavors— much has been written about the challenges in navigating the 
regulatory thicket.17 There have been frequent calls for the need to reduce reg-
ulatory burden18,19 and to achieve proportionality and equivalency in research 
review and oversight.20,21 Those leading these calls include the Academy of 
Medical Sciences in the United Kingdom, which has released several widely cited 
reports calling for regulatory streamlining, notably by the adoption of principles 
such as the following:
 
 1)  to safeguard the well-being of research participants;
 2)  to facilitate high-quality health research to the public benefit;
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 3)  to be proportionate, efficient and coordinated; and
 4)  to maintain and build confidence in the conduct and value of health research 
through independence, transparency, accountability, and consistency.22
 
The case for regulatory streamlining was based on a premise and experiences of 
“a healthcare culture that fails to fully support the value and benefits of health 
research,” and this led to the creation of the unitary Health Research Authority in 
the United Kingdom in 2011, whose tripartite mandate is to promote and protect 
the interests of patients, streamline regulation, and promote transparency in health 
and social care research. Similarly, efforts to put streamlining into practice are 
reflected in the United States, where in 2012, Congress passed the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) Safety and Innovation Act that gave authority to the FDA 
to develop agreements with foreign regulatory authorities for mutual recognition 
of drug inspections. This culminated in March 2017 in an exchange of letters 
between the United States and the European Union allowing regulators to rely 
on their respective good manufacturing practice inspections of pharmaceutical 
manufacturing facilities, and thereby “enable the FDA and EU to avoid the 
duplication of drug inspections, lower inspection costs and enable regulators 
to devote more resources to other parts of the world where there may be greater 
risk” (press release, March 2, 2017).23
Despite these efforts to clear the regulatory thicket and improve pathways for 
research to proceed efficiently, far less attention has been paid to the contributions, 
roles, and responsibilities of the full gamut of actors, agents, and institutions who 
bring about efficient and effective health research within regulatory frameworks, 
whether such frameworks are viewed as streamlined or ostensibly cluttered. At first 
glance, it might seem irrelevant to consider that the principal direct beneficiaries 
of streamlined regulation in this area—researchers—would need assistance in 
working through the thresholds of regulatory approvals (especially when they are 
simplified). However, a recent Nature article has pointed out that when it comes to 
regulatory burden on areas such as working with personal health data, research-
ers “do not have to face the challenge alone.”24 Even in a regulatory environment 
characterized by simplified or streamlined processes and innovative services that 
improve approval times (or other benchmarks), challenges remain in trying to 
work through these processes and arrive at the destination of regulatory approval, 
research commencement, and research output. These challenges are faced not just 
by researchers, but also regulators themselves, not to mention sponsors, funders, 
research participants, and the public at large.
This begs a series of connected questions: aside from researchers, on whom does 
regulatory burden fall, who should work towards its mitigation, and how?
In this article, we do not aspire to answer the empirical dimensions of the 
questions that were raised. Rather, we suggest that there is a crucially important—
but currently largely invisible—role being played in regulatory stewardship in 
the delivery of objectives such as proportionality, improvement in efficiency, 
and streamlining of health research regulation. If these are desirable ends (and 
such a normative question is worthy of further debate in another article), then 
we posit that this role must be made explicit and given wider recognition and 
effect, both in law and in practice. This is true not only in the context of data-
intensive science, as the Nature example suggests, but also across the entire health 
research endeavor.
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Achieving further clarity on what stewardship involves and implies is imperative; 
otherwise, important potential conflicts of interest (among researchers, institutions, 
regulators, and sponsors) will remain masked. Both the diversity of the geostruc-
tural levels and the diversity in the values embedded throughout point to the need 
to further unpack what is meant by regulatory stewardship in preexisting concep-
tualizations and, eventually, what it might look like as the role is more clearly made 
visible.
Our analysis25,26 suggests that these questions require looking beyond formal 
regulatory infrastructures, and also beyond state-regulated practices, to reveal the 
complete picture. In making this claim, we argue that there is a central role being 
played within and throughout health research regulation in the guise of regula-
tory stewardship. At present, regulatory stewardship appears to embody a dual 
role of protecting important human interests, such as those of research partici-
pants, while at the same time promoting core public goods associated with health 
research, such as the optimal facilitation of research ethics review and access to 
research data and other materials.27 Although, from a normative perspective, it is 
possible to support both of these objectives and to envision them working together, 
it is also important to recognize that they might produce a normative conflict in 
practice. We address the possible resolution of any tensions in due course; first, we 
consider instances of where models of stewardship might be found, and extrapo-
late from these examples what might be solid foundations, values, and principles 
that support the role(s) articulated.
Examples of Regulatory Stewardship in Action
Given the focus of this article on regulatory stewardship, this section provides a 
range of examples from various regulatory environments that demonstrate this 
role in action.
An overview of research ethics services and associated literature reveals exam-
ples of actors already performing regulatory stewardship in either one or both of 
the ways already outlined. One such example are scientific officers in Scotland’s 
Research Ethics Service.28 These are uniquely qualified individuals attached to the 
National Health Service (NHS) research ethics committees in Scotland, providing 
researchers with guidance and support on a variety of matters, including com-
pliance with correct documentation and conformity with legal requirements, all of 
which could impact the success of their ethics application and their research as a 
whole. At the same time, scientific officers help guide research ethics committee 
members in evaluating research applications, particularly when it comes to under-
standing the regulatory context of a given application. Another British example 
comes from the Health Research Authority (HRA), which has employed officers 
known as application managers to help researchers navigate through “complex 
cases” that straddle regulatory regimes; for example, involving multiple domains 
such as data, tissue, and devices, and will continue to do so until its streamlining 
HRA approval mechanism is rolled out for all studies.29
Another similar example is NHS research ethics committees themselves. As one 
of us (E.S.D.) has uncovered in empirical work, ethics committee members, indi-
vidually and as a group, see themselves as providing a kind of pastoral support to 
researchers. Yes, they serve to protect the rights, interests, and welfare of research 
participants, but equally, they feel as though they serve to promote ethical research 
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by working with researchers to secure ethics approval. To be clear, the stewardship 
practiced by ethics committee members is not necessarily direct and deliberate 
(and they cannot write an application for a researcher), but through nudges, com-
ments, and responses to queries, members help assuage or even persuade research 
applicants to improve the quality of their research design or to work around a false 
roadblock in law (e.g., a misinterpretation that data protection law or adults with 
incapacity law is stricter than it really is regarding research).
This is seen especially by actors in greater positions of authority within a commit-
tee, such as ethics committee chairs or managers (i.e., administrators) who have 
closer contact with researchers. As one interview participant (a health research 
regulator) stated: “Medical research is hard. We see 6,000 applications a year for 
medical research; it is hard, and we need to be helping these people realise their 
ideas rather than just being what’s seen as a bureaucratic block at the beginning 
of something that is a very long process.…It’s providing the support to enable 
people to realise their goals on an ongoing basis,…working in partnership with 
other people.”30 Similarly, the chair of a research ethics committee explained 
that: “Between meetings, I get lots of correspondence from researchers seeking 
help and asking for advice. And I’m absolutely happy to do that, because it helps 
to create the right environment.… Ultimately we all want the same thing, don’t 
we? We want high quality good research that’s going to make a difference to 
people’s lives.…We all want that. So, yeah, I try and work with researchers as 
much as I can.”31
A prominent example of a similar attempt to guide researchers is UK Biobank 
(UKB), which has been funded with more than £350,000,000, inter alia by Wellcome 
and the UK Medical Research Council. This is with the objective of establishing a 
resource of human tissue and data involving more than 500,000 participants. A key 
feature of the governance of UKB is the existence of its Ethics and Governance 
Council (EGC), designed to act as a “critical friend” to UKB, and it is the responsi-
bility of UKB itself to act as a steward of the resource to promote access for “health-
related research.” A stated objective in its Ethics and Governance Framework is to 
preserve and enhance the resource for the common good of both the research com-
munity and future generations.32 There is not, however, any explicit acknowledge-
ment in access procedures of the role of front line members of the access team in 
guiding applicants through the process.33 This is a further example of the invisibility 
of the stewardship role. Note, too, that the frontline officials within UKB as institu-
tional actors have a different role to the oversight and advisory function of the, EGC 
which stewards the entire endeavor within the broad parameters of obligations 
to participants and society alike. Any tensions between the roles will be revealed 
through public reporting of the work of the EGC via the publication of its minutes.
Further afield, the 2015 report of the Council of the Canadian Academies on 
accessing health and health-related data states:
the Panel found a marked shift among the six best practice entities from 
a “data custodianship” model, in which holding and securing data are 
emphasized to the exclusion of other considerations, to a “data steward-
ship” model, in which enabling access is a core institutional objective pro-
portionately balanced with protecting privacy. The balance is achieved 
through good governance, which encompasses the definition of an entity’s 
purpose, objectives, values, and policies.34
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Although other parameters of good governance are also important—such as trans-
parency, accountability, regulatory effectiveness, and quality—the emphasis here 
is on the role of stewardship itself in delivering these objectives.
Stewardship has even been put on a legal basis. In New Zealand, section 
32 of the State Sector Act 1988 defines “stewardship” as the “active planning 
and management of medium- and long-term interests, along with associated 
advice.” The Act declares that: “The government expects regulatory agencies 
to adopt a whole-of-system view, and take a proactive, collaborative approach 
to the monitoring and care of the regulatory systems within which they have 
policy or operational responsibilities.”35 Although not explicitly stated, recent 
reforms in the United Kingdom health research sector appear to do something 
similar. For example, under the Care Act 2014, it has now been confirmed as a 
matter of law that health research regulatory agencies have responsibilities not 
just to protect research participants’ interests, but also to promote ethical and safe 
research.36
It is important to point out that this range of appeals to “stewardship” demon-
strates it to be a heterogeneous concept. In the examples of the UK Biobank EGC 
and the legislative basis from New Zealand, the role appears to be more one of 
guiding toward particular ends, rather than merely facilitation of access to data or 
ethics review, as the gatekeeper role of research ethics committees and UK Biobank 
management would suggest.37 This in turn can be contrasted with the examples of 
the HRA application managers and scientific officers who tend to walk more with 
researchers on the approvals journey. Nonetheless, what is common to all of the 
examples is the articulation of a valued end-point in the form of a recognized pub-
lic good and its association with a responsibility to support other actors toward 
the realization of such a public good. In the health research context, the public 
goods in play are numerous and well recognised; they include individual and 
public health benefits, the promotion of wider social value from research (such as 
the deepening of human understanding), the redressing of social injustices, and 
even health/wealth generation. Thus, in the research regulation context one might 
contrast:
 
	 •	 	State stewards (acting in a manner deemed to contribute to the public interest; 
e.g., as established by law),
	 •	 	Institutional stewards (acting like gatekeepers to further institutional objectives),
	 •	 	Operational stewards (acting like ushers through the complexity of established 
procedures; e.g., access processes),
	 •	 	Ethics stewards (acting with a stated mandate of protection first then the 
promotion of ethically sound, scientifically robust research after due 
deliberation).
 
This is not to suggest that these roles are necessarily always mutually exclusive 
in remit or value. Still, by seeking to clarify these, we assist in highlighting those 
values that are exclusive to a role and not to be mixed; we differentiate those that 
require more or less ethical responsibility, and we highlight those where there 
might be gray, and potentially dangerous, areas of conflict. Thus, although there 
is doubtless much activity occurring under the broad rubric of stewardship, these 
specific features are currently lost in the noise surrounding regulation and gover-
nance, and the associated benefits are being obscured as a result.
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Even if this is recognized, however, it does not provide sufficient normative 
grounding to link the identification of well-accepted public goods with any claim 
that stewardship ought to be promoted as a means to bring about those public 
goods. Still, we can nonetheless seek to unpack the ways in which these uses of 
stewardship have been connected to public goods and other socially valued ends 
as a first step in building a normative case for stewardship.
What Might Regulatory Stewardship Look Like?
Our examples of stewardship in action are necessarily speculative, partly because 
our claim is that the role is largely invisible. This makes it more difficult to assess 
whether there is any added value arising from regulatory stewardship. Moreover, to 
the extent that there is demonstrable value, the current climate means that the 
nature and scope of its contribution is greatly underappreciated. As a result, the 
precise role of effective regulatory stewardship requires a novel conceptualization 
of what is at stake and what is required.
Unpacking the language of “stewardship” is important. As the previous New 
Zealand example suggests, it is about “a proactive, lifecycle approach to the monitor-
ing and care of the regulatory regimes.” We see something similar in the United 
Kingdom under the Care Act 2014, mentioned previously, which requires many regu-
latory agencies to work together to protect research participants while simultaneously 
promoting research. But these agencies cannot do this alone. In making our claim, 
we suggest that all parties seeking to engage with, and in, health research and its regu-
lation must adopt a similar proactive attitude toward their behaviors. Therefore, for 
researchers, this might mean ensuring that they are sufficiently au fait with ethical and 
legal issues related to the research that they wish to conduct in order to engage mean-
ingfully and in a timely fashion with ethics committees, regulators, and publics. As a 
minimum, it requires that applications explicitly and in an accessible manner, articu-
late how the public interest will be promoted through research.
It would follow also from this that researchers must be trained in, and made 
aware of, this central role in making (good) research happen. As a minimum, this 
would require researchers to acknowledge their role in contributing to streamlined 
regulation by responsible discharge of duties to work with regulators effectively. 
Regulatory stewardship can also be present in peer-to-peer interactions; for example, 
where researchers’ experience of a particular regulatory mechanism is disseminated 
to colleagues.38 It is crucial that individuals and institutions do not “outsource 
regulation”39 as a matter to be handled by others, perpetuating a culture of Them 
and Us and an unhelpful dynamic of seeing regulation as a hurdle to be overcome. 
This is not to suggest that regulatory regimes should not be reformed, but a failure 
to reveal and explain some of these crucial roles within regulatory schema, runs 
the risk not only of ignoring achievements to date, but also of directing calls for 
regulatory and legal reform in entirely the wrong direction.
Key Features of Regulatory Stewardship
For us, key features from the previous examples include the following.
 
	 •	 	The	decoupling	of	stewardship	from	the	state	as	principal	actor	in	health	
research regulation, particularly when the state is the source of legal rules and 
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proscribed action in the form of “hard law” regulation; the point is that there 
are stewardship actors who can and do play a stewardship role in delivering 
effective health research governance in addition to any regulatory functions 
that might be in operation;
	 •	 	Relatedly,	there	is	the	importance	of	appreciating	that	individuals	or	assem-
blages of people, not just regulators or their agents, can deliver regulatory 
stewardship. Empirical evidence has suggested that effective regulation is 
often only “instantiated” through practice;40 that is, it emerges as a product 
of genuine cooperation of regulators and a range of other actors, including 
researchers themselves; there are, therefore, good reasons to ask whether effi-
cacy might be improved further still by new actors charged with responsibili-
ties to achieve precisely such ends;
	 •	 	Regulatory	stewardship	does	not	seem	to	require	a	legal	basis	or	authority	in	
order to play a role; this helps to explain why it might occur within very infor-
mal or even invisible frameworks;
	 •	 	The	ongoing	challenge	of	understanding	whether	there	is	a	complementary	
role that is being played by stewards in addition to more formal regulation; 
for example, in negotiating uncertainty about the relevance of particular legal 
regimes or rules within regulatory frameworks and finding ways through; and
	 •	 	The	importance	of	contrasting	a	concept	such	as	“stewardship”	with	that	of	
“custodianship”; whereas the latter embodies a largely protective notion in 
everyday language, the term “stewardship” can be understood as more natu-
rally reflecting the dual roles we posited previously; namely, not simply acting 
in a protecting capacity, but also promoting the pursuit of clearly identified 
ends, which in the health research context include the public interest of deliv-
ering ethically robust, scientifically sound research. Notwithstanding, this tells 
us nothing about how to resolve any tensions that might arise in practice when 
attempting to achieve both roles in a setting that sets them against each other. 
The silent shift toward a dual role approach, as demonstrated by the Care Act 
2014 and the Council of the Canadian Academies report examples (cited pre-
viously), must not pass unnoticed or elide policies and practices that foresee 
and anticipate possible tensions and ways to resolve them.
 
Accepting this last caveat, we suggest that given all of the important roles that 
regulatory stewardship is clearly being asked to play, there are good reasons to 
believe that it adds value to existing (legal) regimes of health research regulation, 
and as a minimum, that this is a proposition that merits further (empirical) enquiry. 
Normatively, and crucially, we propose that regulatory stewardship is a responsibility 
for all actors engaged in health research regulation. The failure to see regulation as 
an inherently collective responsibility will stand in the way of the optimization of 
effective regulation. It requires both individuals and institutions, and researchers 
and regulators alike, to commit to the common goal of progress in human health 
and well-being.
Taking the example of data and tissue stewards, this responsibility might mean 
that roles are committed to making resources actively available for research, 
including not just quality assurance, but also transparent explanations of the con-
texts in which data and tissue will be available for research. For regulators and 
ethics and governance managers, it might mean appointing dedicated staff to assist 
researchers and others to maneuver complex regulatory regimes. For example, the 
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Scottish Health Informatics Programme identified the central role of research 
coordinators to undertake a brokering function between the researcher and regu-
lator communities.41
Recognizing Potential Limitations Beyond Reality and the Common Interest
We acknowledge certain potential limitations with the regulatory stewardship 
model. For example, it has been stated that stewards “see properties [in research] 
not limited to one research field.”42 However, this role cannot, and should not, 
be reduced to a single actor category; that is, to some new form of regulator (or a 
narrowly defined regulatory role), potentially a new regulatory burden. The risk 
of creating an actor category is that the role is seen as someone else’s responsibility 
and effectively someone else’s problem. We argue that stewardship represents and 
encourages a collective state of mind and action. Even so, this claim to diffuse 
action throughout the regulatory environment carries its own challenges: who has 
the authority to act, who is accountable, how does the concept of stewardships 
interact with other values in health research regulation, such as transparency and 
fairness, and, ultimately, who is liable? These are all reasonable questions that our 
analysis throws into sharp relief in making the invisible, visible. The answer, in part, 
is to avoid seeing this responsibility as part of formal regulatory structures. If the 
“regulatory space” must be filled, then this is a call to fill it with institutions that 
support and clearly direct actors operating within that space with clear expectations 
about their attitudes and behaviors.
At the same time, the crucial watchword of proportionality in health research 
regulation must not be overlooked. Therefore, two principal challenges in giving 
effect to regulatory stewardship are to address the questions of who takes on this 
role, and how the role is to be executed effectively? We have argued elsewhere that 
the realization of social value from health research is a processual endeavor; that 
is, that it occurs over time and across numerous regulatory thresholds, from initial 
ethics review and approval to subsequent publication of research findings and 
their uptake into practice.43 This in itself presents considerable challenges for any 
stewardship role, because the regulatory landscapes and actors are multiple, over-
lapping, often disconnected, and sometimes entirely bespoke (as in the context of 
complex research protocols that involve a range of regulatory objects such as data, 
tissue, or embryos). The need for proportionality within each of these regulatory 
silos is now well recognized, but what is less clear and far less appreciated is the 
unmet need for proportionality across regulatory silos and sectors. It is precisely 
this unmet need that strengthens any case to embolden a role for regulatory stew-
ardship, tempered by the need always to envision and enact this in ways that only 
add value and not further regulatory burden.
Conclusion
We contend in this article that regulatory stewardship is present within health 
research regulation, but that it is currently largely invisible and, therefore, its 
potential is underappreciated. We attempt herein to make the implicit explicit, and 
to reveal some of the normative bases for seeing this as a valuable feature of regu-
latory landscapes. This is an important start, but it is also only a partial picture. 
The reality is that regulatory stewardship already happens. We posit that stewardship 
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has a role across all sectors of research, and includes the bridge between the clinic/
research divide. Equally, we recognize the risk that by recognizing and formalizing 
this, it could become another example of outsourcing responsibility. This risk can 
only be avoided if the charge is taken up that researchers themselves also see regu-
latory stewardship as part of their role, understand its value, and are offered the 
necessary support in order to fulfil the associated responsibilities that arise out of 
the stewardship role. For these reasons, we commend the recommendations of the 
British Academy/Royal Society and the HLEG, as well as the call of the European 
Council, and we propose this vital complementary responsibility of regulatory 
stewardship. This is not about regulation as authority, but rather about regulation 
as a part of a community of common and collective interest.
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